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Abstract:  
 
There is a large literature on the effect of exchange rate arrangements on trade. The 
monetary policy used in the floating exchange rate regime, however, is usually 
ignored and unidentified in the empirical studies. This makes the effect of alternative 
monetary policy regimes on trade remains largely unknown. This paper sheds light on 
this area by examining the effect of two well-defined monetary policy regimes, 
namely exchange-rate targeting and inflation targeting regimes, on bilateral and 
multilateral trade. Our result suggests a moderate positive effect of inflation targeting 
policy on bilateral trades between two inflation targeting countries. This effect of 
inflation targeting, even much moderate than the effect of currency union and a fixed 
exchange rate at the bilateral level, could exist in the bilateral trades with a large 
number of trading partners under the same regime. This implies that inflation targeting 
regime may not have a lower level of multilateral trade than exchange-rate targeting 
regime. We further support this view with an analysis of multilateral trade. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: E42, E52, E58, F14 
Keywords: Monetary Policy Regimes; Inflation Targeting; Exchange-rate Targeting; 
Gravity Model; Trade 
  
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Terence Tai-Leung Chong, Department of Economics, The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong. Email: chong2064@cuhk.edu.hk.  
2 
 
“…… for both trade and welfare a comparison across exchange-rate systems depends 
crucially on precisely how each system is implemented. For example, it can make a 
big difference whether a one-side or cooperative peg is adopted, and how the degree 
of policy flexibility under a float is used to respond to idiosyncratic demand and 
supply shocks.” 
 
 
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2000) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is a large literature on the effect of exchange rate arrangement on trade. The 
influential work of Rose (2000) and other subsequent studies of Rose and Van 
Wincoop (2001a), Glick and Rose (2002) and Frankel and Rose (2002) show that 
there is a strong positive effect of a common currency on trade. This conclusion is 
supported by Klein and Shambaugh (2006) and Adam and Cobham (2007) using more 
detailed classifications on exchange rate systems. In addition, Klein and Shambaugh 
(2006) find that a fixed exchange rate in other more general forms also expands trade. 
Their finding suggests a positive effect of a fixed exchange rate on trade between a 
base country and a country that pegs to it. 
 
These evidences suggest that exchange rate targeting policy, either in the form of 
currency union or others, could benefit trade. The monetary policy used in the 
alternative floating exchange rate regime, on the other hand, is usually ignored in 
these studies. The importance of monetary policy strategies in the comparison of trade 
across exchange-rate regimes, however, is highlighted by Bacchetta and Van Wincoop 
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(2000). In contrast to partial equilibrium models which usually formulate exchange 
rate volatility as exogenous, the full equilibrium approach in Bacchetta and Van 
Wincoop (2000) models exchange rate volatility as a result of underlying monetary 
shock. The standard argument for the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on 
trade under a floating rate could therefore be compensated by the offsetting effect of 
monetary shock on demand in the full equilibrium model. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop 
(2000) show that a fixed exchange rate does not necessarily lead to more bilateral 
trades under certain assumptions, and the comparison of trade across exchange-rate 
regimes turns out to depend crucially on how the degree of monetary policy flexibility 
under a floating rate is used to respond to shocks. Unfortunately, empirical study on 
the possible effects of monetary policies on trade is absent. 
 
This paper sheds light on this area by examining the effect of alternative monetary 
policy regimes on trade based on a comprehensive de facto classification of monetary 
policy framework from Wong and Chong (2014). The two well-defined monetary 
policy regimes— inflation targeting and exchange-rate targeting regimes classified in 
Wong and Chong (2014), provide an opportunity to explore whether flexibility of 
monetary policy under a floating exchange rate matters for trade. In particular, this 
paper studies the effect of inflation targeting policy on trades between two inflation 
targeting countries, which remains unexplored in the existing literature. 
 
Results of this paper support the previous findings on the strong positive effect of 
exchange rate targeting policy on trade. In addition, this paper reveals a moderate 
positive effect of inflation targeting policy on bilateral trades between two inflation 
targeting countries. Unlike the single direct peg relationship in an exchange-rate 
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targeting policy, an inflation targeting country could trade with many more countries 
under the same regime. This moderate effect is therefore accumulative at the 
multilateral level, further suggesting that inflation targeting regime may not have a 
lower level of multilateral trade than exchange-rate targeting regime. This view is 
supported by the analysis of multilateral trade under the two monetary policy regimes. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The methodology, classification of 
monetary policy regimes and data are discussed in section 2. Section 3 presents the 
main results of the gravity model using bilateral data. Section 4 discusses the 
implication of the effects of bilateral trade on multilateral trade and provides an 
empirical analysis of the trade performance across alternative monetary policy 
regimes. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Methodology and Data 
 
2.1. The Gravity Model 
 
This paper investigates the effect of monetary policy on bilateral trade using the 
standard gravity model: 
 
 
݈ݐݎܽ݀݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݌ݎ݃݀݌௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݀݅ݏݐ௜,௝ ൅ ߚଷܿݐݕ ൅ ߠ ௜ܺ,௝,௧ ൅ ߛܯ ௜ܲ,௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ (1)
 
 
where  
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ltrade is the natural logarithm of trade between two countries i and j at time t in real 
term1,  
lprgdp is the natural logarithm of the product of real GDP of the two countries and 
ldist is the natural logarithm of their distance.  
The variable cty is a vector of dummies for all countries in the data in which two 
dummies representing the trading countries in a bilateral trade observation are equal to 
1.  
 
A discussion on the theoretical foundation for the use of these variables is offered in 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). In their model, the distance between trading 
countries represents a proxy of trading costs and the country-specific dummies are an 
alternative to replace the “multilateral resistance” of different countries. Empirically, a 
set of control variables as represented by X are included in the estimations. This paper 
follows the literature to include a set of commonly-used control variables which are 
the dummies for common language, the existence of a free trade agreement, trading 
countries with the same colonizer, a colony-colonizer relationship and a variable for 
bilateral exchange rate volatility.  
 
The effect of monetary policy regimes on trade is measured by ߛ and MP describes the 
monetary policy relationship of the two countries at the bilateral level. Country-year 
observations are classified in exchange-rate targeting and inflation targeting regimes 
in Wong and Chong (2014). The interactions of the two monetary policy regimes are 
categorized in five monetary policy relationships at the bilateral level which are 
currency union, direct peg, indirect peg, both inflation targeting and others in this 
                                                 
1 The trade values in real term are estimated with the nominal trade values deflated by US inflation. 
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study. Since bilateral exchange rate volatility is included in the estimations, it is 
important to note that the coefficients of these monetary policy relationships are their 
effect on trade after controlling their impact through exchange rate volatility. 
 
Three of the monetary policy relationships examined in this study, namely currency 
union, direct peg and indirect peg, have been studied in the earlier literature. Currency 
union is regarded as the strongest form of exchange-rate targeting regime and is 
usually identified separately. It is argued that the reduction in transaction costs and the 
serious commitment to a fixed rate achieved by the use of a common currency may 
not be otherwise achieved in other forms of exchange-rate targeting. Empirical 
evidence also supports that the effect of a currency union membership on trade is 
much stronger than that other exchange-rate targeting arrangements. The effect of 
traditional currency unions such as the CFA franc zone and the Caribbean Currency 
Union is very strong and the positive effect on trade ranges from an increase of 80% to 
300%2. The trade effect of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is arguably smaller 
with an estimated effect between 6% and 46%3. This study follows the widely-adopted 
approach in Rose (2000), Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and others to define currency 
union as (i) a country which does not issue its own currency and uses that of another, 
or (ii) uses a multilateral currency of a monetary union. This also includes a few cases 
where there is a considerable currency substitution between two currencies with a 
long-term peg at par. 
 
Exchange rate fixed without using a common currency could also have an effect on 
                                                 
2 For example, see Rose (2000), Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), Glick and Rose (2002) and Frankel and 
Rose (2002). 
3 For example, see Micco et al. (2003) and Berger and Nitch (2008). 
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trade beyond that of reduced volatility. For example, Klein and Shambaugh (2006) 
argue that the presence of a peg could indicate a strong likelihood that the exchange 
rate will be close to constant over a period of time in the future. They offer empirical 
evidence on a large and significant effect of a fixed exchange rate and the bilateral 
trade between a base country and a country that peg to it expands by nearly 30%. 
Based on the coordinated multilateral exchange-rate targeting under the gold standard, 
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2003) also find an effect with similar magnitude 
between countries under the gold standard. Similar to Klein and Shambaugh (2006), a 
country is determined to have a direct peg with a certain base country in a given year 
when they have the lowest bilateral exchange rate volatility among a group of base 
currencies4 in this study.  An indirect peg, on the other hand, exists for two exchange-
rate targeting countries pegging to the same base currency5. Estimations in Klein and 
Shambaugh (2006) show that indirect peg has a negative impact on trade even though 
the effect is not statistically significant.  
 
The new classification of Wong and Chong (2014) provides an opportunity to estimate 
the effect of inflation targeting policy on trade. In particular, the effect of inflation 
targeting policy on bilateral trade between two inflation targeting countries is studied. 
Since foreign exchange intervention is always an important channel for inflation 
targeting countries to control inflation, it is possible that trade between two inflation 
targeting countries is encouraged through a expectedly more stable exchange rate 
following the argument in Klein and Shambaugh (2006). To investigate the potential 
                                                 
4 A list of base currencies is available in Wong and Chong (2014) which in turn is mainly based on the 
list in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Rose (2000). 
5 For a country which uses a multilateral currency such as the euro, it is considered to have an indirect 
peg to another country if the multilateral currency is being pegged by another country. 
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trade effect empirically, trade between two inflation targeting countries is identified as 
“Both IT”. All other bilateral monetary policy relationships other than the four 
categories are grouped as others and used as the base case in the estimations.  
 
Early empirical studies on currency union were mainly based on results obtained from 
pooled OLS estimation. Even though a country pair fixed effect model is more robust 
with time-invariant omitted variables, the near absence of variations in the currency 
union status for countries in the early datasets has largely limited its use. For the later 
studies covering observations in longer period, the fixed effect model becomes a more 
common approach6. Other than the least squares method, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
and Tenreyro (2007) suggest a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) 
estimator based on the generalized method of moments approach to handle several 
biases including the sample selection problem in the usual log-linearized estimation. 
The empirical results obtained by PPML, however, are found to be highly consistent 
with the results from OLS estimations. The country pair fixed effect model is used as 
the main approach in this paper in view of its robustness and the long period of data 
covered in the dataset. Estimations by pooled OLS are also included for reference. 
 
2.2. The Classification and Data 
 
This study covers observations for the 228 countries reporting to the IMF over the 
post-Bretton Woods period from 1974 to 20097. The classification of monetary policy 
                                                 
6 For example, see Glick and Rose (2002) on currency union in general; Frankel (2008) and Berger and 
Nitsch (2008) on European Monetary Union and Klein and Shambaugh (2006) on various exchange 
rate arrangements. 
7 In some cases, data of a country may not be available since the country does not exist in the entire 
sample period. Out of the 228 countries reported in the list of IMF, 186 countries have been classified at 
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regimes is based on Wong and Chong (2014), where country-year observations are 
grouped into two monetary policy regimes: exchange-rate targeting and inflation 
targeting according to the similarity in the observed volatility of the instrument 
variable, interest rate and two outcome variables, exchange rate and inflation rate 
using k-means cluster analysis. There are classifications used in similar studies with 
alternative methodology. For example, the classification used in Klein and Shambaugh 
(2006) is solely based on the behaviors of countries’ official exchange rates. As argued 
by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), however, such a strategy may misleadingly 
group countries with small shocks in a fixed exchange regime. Therefore, it is possible 
that the positive effect on trade found in Klein and Shambaugh (2006) comes from the 
occurrence of smaller-than-average shock8 rather than a direct peg relationship. The 
incorporation of a monetary policy instrument in the classification as in Wong and 
Chong (2014) could minimize this problem. The inclusion of inflation targeting as the 
alternative policy framework in the classification is also important. It is not 
uncommon for inflation targeting countries such as New Zealand, Finland, and 
Norway to maintain relatively stable currencies with heavy intervention in foreign 
exchange markets in order to achieve stable inflation. These observations are usually 
misleadingly classified as fixed exchange rate regime in the classification frameworks 
using a fixed versus floating rate system. Wong and Chong (2014), on the other hand, 
classify these observations as inflation targeting regime.  
 
Data for currency unions and other variables in the gravity model including trade 
agreements, distances between countries, and dummies for common language, 
                                                                                                                                            
least for one period. 
8 It is also possible that it is a direct effect of low exchange rate volatility if the relationship between 
exchange rate volatility and trade is nonlinear. 
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common border, same colonizer, colonizer-colony relationship, number of islands, and 
landlocked are obtained from the dataset of Rose and Spiegel (2011) and extended 
with information from the World Bank, WTO, and corresponding central banks. The 
trade data is obtained from the Direction of Trade Statistics and real GDP data is 
sourced from the World Bank. Multilateral and bilateral exchange rate volatilities are 
measured as the average of absolute monthly changes in the exchange rate obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics.  
 
3. The Main Results 
 
3.1. Baseline Estimations 
 
The summary statistics of five monetary policy relationships including currency 
union, direct peg, indirect peg, both inflation targeting, and others are reported in 
Table 1. The statistics in general are consistent with the conventional understandings. 
The currency union members are usually relatively small in economic size, closer to 
each other, more likely to share a common language, border, and from the same 
colonizer. As expected, countries within a currency union and under a direct peg 
relationship trade much more than countries of other relationships but the differences 
probably reflect the endogeneity of regime choice. Exchange rate volatility between 
currency union members is extremely low by definition9. Direct and indirect pegs are 
similar in terms of exchange rate volatility but later estimations show that their effects 
on trade are very different. Unsurprisingly, exchange rate volatility is highest among 
                                                 
9 The exchange rate volatility between currency union members is non-zero as some countries may not 
join or form a currency union for the whole year period. 
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inflation targeting countries.  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics on Bilateral Monetary Policy Relationship 
 Either One is Exchange-rate Targeting Both are 
Inflation 
Targeting 
 Currency  
Union 
Direct   
Peg 
Indirect  
Peg 
Others
Total observations 3,274 1,389 13,661 84,226 26,115 
Number of switches 127 552 7,570 - 330 
Bilateral trade (in billions) 1.25 1.36 0.09 0.15 0.56 
Lprgdp 46.74 52.54 47.74 49.11 50.46 
Ldist 6.61 8.34 7.82 8.22 8.30 
Exchange rate volatility 0.01 0.47 0.41 3.81 4.89 
Common language 0.72 0.49 0.32 0.19 0.23 
Common border 0.22 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Common colony 0.64 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.07 
Colony 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Number of islands 0.24 0.24 0.37 0.34 0.41 
Number of landlockeds 0.48 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.30 
Free trade agreement 0.64 0.08 0.33 0.23 0.33 
      
 
 
Estimation results of the gravity model are presented in Table 2. The baseline model is 
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estimated under several econometric methods and results are reported in the first three 
columns. The first two columns are results estimated by traditional pooled OLS 
method where the estimation in the second column includes the country dummies to 
proxy for the multilateral resistance suggested in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). 
Results in the third column, on the other hand, are estimated with the fixed effect 
model to control any unobservable variables affecting trade at country pair level. 
 
The estimation results are highly consistent with the existing literature. The signs of 
the control variables are in line with the theoretical gravity model as well as previous 
empirical studies. The estimated effects of several monetary policy relationships are 
qualitatively comparable to the findings in the literature. The country pair fixed effect 
model reports that currency union members trade nearly 40% more than the base case.  
As suggested in the fourth column, this effect is similar between the recently formed 
EMU and the traditional currency unions. Unsurprisingly, the estimated effect on the 
other traditional currency unions is statistically insignificant because of the lack of 
currency union membership variations in the fixed effect model10.  
 
Even though both direct and indirect peg relationships lead to relatively low exchange 
rate volatility between trading partners, their effects on trade are opposite. Similar to 
the results found by Klein and Shambaugh (2006), Table 2 reports that a direct peg is 
estimated to increase trade by 21%. The indirect peg pair, however, trades about 14% 
less. This opposition supports the view in the literature that exchange rate 
arrangements are likely to influence trade through channels other than the realized 
                                                 
10 On the other hand, Glick and Rose (2002) establish the statistically significance by tracing back their 
data to 1948 to include sufficient variations in the currency union membership for the fixed effect 
model estimation. 
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exchange rate volatility. One of the possible explanations is that the expected 
exchange rate volatility under the indirect peg is much more uncertain as the 
relationship depends on the decision of the two pegging countries to maintain their 
pegs. 
 
Table 2. Monetary Policy Relationships and Bilateral Trade 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effect 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)
Currency union 0.61***
(0.15)  
0.11  
(0.15)  
 0.32***
(0.07)  
 0.37***
(0.07)  
  EMU 
    
0.37*** 
(0.04)  
 
  Other currency unions 
    
0.32  
(0.25)  
 
Direct peg 0.67***
(0.08)  
0.36***
(0.10)  
 0.19***
(0.06)  
0.19*** 
(0.06)  
0.57***
(0.07)  
Indirect peg -0.21***
(0.05)  
-0.18***
(0.04)  
 -0.15***
(0.02)  
-0.15*** 
(0.02)  
-0.15***
(0.02)  
Both IT 0.16***
(0.03)  
0.03  
(0.02)  
 0.06***
(0.01)  
0.06*** 
(0.01)  
0.07***
(0.01)  
Exchange volatility -0.07  
(0.03)  
-0.05  
(0.03)  
 -0.04** 
(0.02)  
-0.04**  
(0.02)  
-0.04** 
(0.02)  
Free trade agreement 0.18***
(0.04)  
0.36***
(0.04)  
 0.32***
(0.03)  
0.32*** 
(0.03)  
0.32***
(0.03)  
Lprgdp 1.11***
(0.01)  
1.12***
(0.04)  
 1.16***
(0.04)  
1.16*** 
(0.04)  
1.16***
(0.04)  
Ldist -1.30***
(0.03)  
-1.64***
(0.03)  
    
Common language 0.55***
(0.05)  
0.46***
(0.05)  
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Common border 0.83***
(0.14)  
0.32** 
(0.14)  
    
Common colony 0.79***
(0.08)  
0.74***
(0.07)  
    
Colony-colonizer 1.21***
(0.12)  
1.31***
(0.14)  
    
Islands 0.08  
(0.04)  
     
Landlocked -0.55***
(0.03)  
     
Log product of land areas -0.13***
(0.01)  
 
    
       
Country dummies No Yes  - - -
N 128,665 128,665  128,665 128,665 128,665
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.78  0.15 0.15 0.15
Hausman (p-value)  0.00 0.00    1.00
       
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Year effects are included but not reported 
Standard errors are clustered at country pair level 
 
The main results of Table 2 reveal that there is a positive effect of inflation targeting 
policy on bilateral trade between two inflation targeting countries. The estimated 
effect is around 6%, which is much more moderate than the effect of a common 
currency and direct peg. Nevertheless, the effect is statistically significant across 
various specifications. 
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Table 3. Comparisons of the Estimated Trade Effect of Currency Union and 
Direct Peg with Other Studies 
 Data 
Coverage 
Country Fixed 
Effect Model 
(Pooled OLS) 
Country pair 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
 
Estimated Coefficients on Currency Union     
Baseline  1974-2009 0.11
(0.15)
0.32 
(0.07) 
 
Excluding data after 1998 1974-1998 1.01
(0.21)
- 
 
Separate dummies for EMU and other 
currency unions 
1974-2009 0.86
(0.19)
- 
 
Excluding EMU data from the sample 1974-2009 0.88
(0.18)
- 
 
Rose and Van Wincoop (2001a) 1970-1995, 
5-year 
interval
0.86
(0.19)
- 
 
Glick and Rose (2002) 1948-1997 1.30
(0.13)
0.59 
(0.05) 
 
Klein and Shambaugh (2006) 1973-1999 1.23
(0.16)
0.32 
(0.13) 
 
     
Estimated Coefficients on Direct Peg     
Baseline 1974-2009 0.36
(0.10)
0.19 
(0.06) 
 
Klein and Shambaugh (2006) 1973-1999 0.32
(0.15)
0.19 
(0.09) 
 
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2003) 1870-1910,  
5-year 
interval
0.28
(0.13)
0.15 
(0.08) 
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Table 3 provides a comparison between the estimated effects in this paper and that in 
previous studies. In particular, the small and highly insignificant effect estimated on 
the currency union by the pooled OLS with country dummies (also called country 
fixed effect model (CFE)) is strikingly different from previous studies and is 
investigated with several sensitivity tests. Sensitivity tests on the CFE model reveal 
that the results are mainly distorted by the EMU observations which are not covered in 
the early studies using the CFE model. Once the distortion in EMU data is removed 
from various specifications, the estimated effect of currency union on trade becomes 
highly consistent with the existing literature. Results of the country pair fixed effect 
model, nevertheless, are similar across various studies. 
 
3.2. Instrument Variable Estimation 
 
To address the possible endogeneity of monetary policy regimes, the baseline model is 
estimated with an instrumental variable and results are presented in the last column of 
Table 2. As argued in Rose (2000), “trade considerations seem irrelevant when a 
country decides whether to join or leave a common currency area” and this argument 
is even stronger in this study with currency union observation including the EMU. 
Empirically, the endogeneity of currency union is also found to have no significant 
effect as suggested by the instrumental variables estimations. It is equally hard to 
argue that endogeneity exists for countries in indirect peg and inflation targeting 
regime. The main concern on the endogeneity of monetary policy regimes, therefore, 
rests on the direct peg relationship. It is possible that a country pegs its currency to 
another country due to a close trade relationship rather than the direct peg causes more 
17 
trade.  
 
The instrumental variable used in this paper follows the approach of Klein and 
Shambaugh (2006), which in turn draws on the insight of Tenreyro (2007). For two 
trading countries, the percentage of countries in country j’s region that are directly 
pegged with country i is used as the instrumental variable. To stabilize its exchange 
rate with neighbors, it is more likely for a country to have a peg with another country 
if more countries in its region choose to do so. This percentage, however, is unlikely 
to be correlated with trade between country i and j. This percentage is therefore 
considered as an appropriate instrument11. As shown in last column, the result of the 
instrument variable estimation is similar to the baseline estimation of the fixed effect 
model in the third column. In particular, the moderate positive trade effect between 
inflation targeting countries remain statistically significant. 
 
 
4. An Analysis of the Trade Performance of Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
4.1. The Implication of Results on Bilateral Trade 
 
In the gravity model estimation, inflation targeting policy is found to have a positive 
effect on bilateral trade with countries in the same regime. The effect is much more 
moderate than the effects on trade between currency union members and trade 
between countries in a direct peg. This result, however, does not necessarily imply a 
                                                 
11 In practice, the percentage of countries in country j’s region that are directly pegged with country i 
and the percentage of countries in country i’s region pegged to country j are computed. The higher one 
of these two percentages is used as the instrumental variable. 
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worse trade performance of inflation targeting regime at the multilateral level. The 
reason is that the moderate effect of inflation targeting policy could exist in the 
bilateral trades with a large number of trading partners in the same regime at the 
multilateral level. The trade creation effect of exchange-rate targeting policy under a 
direct peg, by contrast, is restricted to a single anchor country12. For example, in the 
year of 2005, Singapore in the inflation targeting regime was trading with the other 56 
inflation targeting countries. Hong Kong which adopts an exchange-rate targeting 
policy with a currency board system could only maintain a direct peg relationship with 
the United States. Table 4 provides the statistics on the average number of bilateral 
monetary policy relationships in various monetary policy regimes. As shown in Table 
4, the effect of inflation targeting on trade could be amplified 36 times for inflation 
targeting regime13. It should also be noted that the average number of members in a 
currency union is 7, meaning that the positive effect of using a common currency is 
also applied on more than one bilateral trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Countries issuing the base currencies, which are being pegged by others, could be in direct peg with 
more than one country. These countries, however, should be considered as exceptional cases and have 
least policy relevance. 
13 It is also interesting to note that inflation targeting countries also have the level of direct peg 
relationship comparable to exchange-rate targeting countries. It is because inflation targeting countries 
are usually pegged by a number of exchange-rate targeting countries.  
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Table 4. Bilateral Monetary Policy Relationships and Monetary Policy Regimes 
  Monetary Policy Regimes  
  Inflation Targeting Currency Union Exchange-rate 
Targeting (Non-CU) 
 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Po
lic
y 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 
     
Both IT 36.12 0.00 0.00  
Direct peg 0.95 0.31 0.71  
Indirect peg 0.00 8.38 10.06  
Currency 
union 
0.00 6.89 0.00  
Others 43.86 42.41 34.36  
     
Statistics reported in the table are the average number of monetary policy relationships in various 
monetary policy regimes at the bilateral trade level. For example, an inflation targeting country is 
trading with 36 other inflation targeting countries on average. The direct peg relationship in the 
inflation targeting regime is larger than zero as inflation targeting countries may be pegged by several 
other exchange-rate targeting countries. On the other hand, the average direct peg relationship is less 
than one in the exchange-rate targeting regime because issuing entities of some anchor currencies such 
as SDR and EMU do not exist in the trade statistics. 
 
 
A naïve computation on the trade performance of monetary policy regimes using the 
average bilateral trade statistics in Table 1, the estimated effect of various monetary 
policy relationships on trade in Table 2 and the number of monetary policy 
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relationships in different monetary policy regimes, suggest that currency union would 
have the most positive effect on multilateral trade in view of the strong effect on trade 
between its members and the moderate number of members in the currency union. 
Following the currency union, inflation targeting outperforms the non-currency union 
exchange-rate targeting regime with the amplified moderate effect on trade between 
countries in the inflation targeting regime. The actual performance of alternative 
monetary policy regimes, nevertheless, is an empirical issue to be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
4.2. An Analysis on Multilateral Trade 
 
Table 5 presents a summary of statistics on the two monetary policy regimes and their 
subgroups. In general, countries in the exchange-rate targeting regime have lower 
level of multilateral trade than inflation targeting regime and are smaller in both 
economic size and land area. Given that, a simple comparison of trade between two 
regimes may not be valid. The recently formed EMU and other traditional currency 
unions including the CFA franc zone in Africa and the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Union exhibit similarities as well as differences. Compared to the inflation targeting 
regime and non-currency union exchange-rate targeting regime, both EMU and 
traditional currency unions are very durable. The EMU members, however, have an 
average gross domestic product over 150 times that of the members of traditional 
currency unions which are usually formed by small and developing economies. This 
suggests that factors determining trade between members of EMU and other 
traditional currency unions could be largely different and this probably explains the 
striking result on the currency union coefficient estimated with the FCE model in 
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Table 2. 
 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics for Monetary Policy Regimes 
 Inflation 
Targeting 
Exchange-rate Targeting 
 Overall Non-CU EMU Other CUs
Total observations 857 868 415 121 332
Number of switches 442 355 339 13 1
Advanced economies 437 171 47 121 3
Multilateral trade (in 
billions) 
52.51 25.18 17.29 119.21 0.76
Real GDP (in billions) 827.43 238.42 222.33 932.94 5.42
Effective exchange rate 
volatility:  
     
Nominal 1.82% 1.42% 2.12% 0.54% 0.85%
Real 1.90% 1.65% 2.25% 0.56% 1.30%
Land area (in ‘000 km2) 1,352 642 1,164 204 149
Island 0.20 0.26 0.13 0.03 0.51
Landlocked 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.09
Duration of regime 5 years 10 years 4 years 8 years 20 years
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Table 5 also provides another hint that findings at the bilateral level do not necessarily 
extend to the multilateral level for the monetary policy regimes. Even though an 
exchange-rate targeting country could enjoy relatively low bilateral exchange rate 
volatility with its anchor country, its multilateral exchange rate volatility is higher than 
an inflation targeting country as is suggested in Table 5. Indeed, the results on the 
effect of exchange-rate targeting policy on multilateral exchange rate volatility are 
mixed. Evidences provided by Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005), Klein and 
Shambaugh (2008) and many other studies support that the fixed exchange rate regime 
has a lower volatility in nominal and real multilateral exchange rate against the 
floating regime. Rose (2007), however, shows that the fixed exchange rate regime 
may not enjoy lower exchange rate volatility, instead it may suffer a higher volatility 
when compared to the inflation targeting regime based on a small sample. Table 6 
presents some simple comparisons of exchange rate volatility between monetary 
policy regimes estimated with fixed effect model. Consistent with the literature, the 
results are mixed. Even though the exchange-rate targeting regime is found to have 
lower exchange rate volatility on average, statistical significance is only observed for 
the real exchange rate. The effect of different monetary policy regimes rather than 
bilateral monetary policy on trade performance probably has higher policy relevance. 
Unlike the studies on the effect of a common currency or a direct peg on bilateral 
trade, the empirical study on the effects of various policy regimes on multilateral trade 
is relatively scanty. One exception is the evidence on the positive effect of currency 
union membership on multilateral trade in the working paper version of Frankel and 
Rose (2002). 
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Table 6. Monetary Policy Regimes and Effective Exchange Rate Volatility  
 Nominal Exchange Rate  
Volatility 
Real Exchange Rate  
Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
All exchange-rate targeting -0.13  
(0.35)  
 
-0.45*** 
(0.16)  
 
Non-currency union 
exchange-rate targeting 
 
-0.30  
(0.40)  
 
-0.68***
(0.20)  
Currency union 
 
0.43  
(0.25)  
 
0.34  
(0.25)  
     
N 1,725 1,725 1,725 1,725
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06
     
*** significant at 1% 
Results obtained from fixed effect model  
Year effects are included but not reported 
Standard errors are clustered at country level 
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Table 7 presents the estimations for the multilateral trade performance of various 
monetary policy regimes. The results are estimated with both pooled OLS and fixed 
effect model with related control variables captured from the gravity model14. Results 
estimated with pooled OLS and fixed effect model in the first two columns show that 
the exchange-rate targeting regime as a whole fails to report any significant effects on 
multilateral trade against the inflation targeting regime.  
 
The estimation in the third column split exchange-rate targeting regime into two 
subgroups of currency unions and non-currency unions. The result supports the 
finding in Frankel and Rose (2002) that currency unions have more trades. 15 
Exchange-rate targeting regime other than currency union, however, reports a lower 
level of multilateral trade than inflation targeting regime. The last two columns of 
Table 4 present the estimation results with two alternative specifications. Estimation in 
the fourth column replaces the nominal exchange rate volatility with the real exchange 
rate volatility, and the fifth column removes the exchange rate volatility from the 
specification to include the effect of monetary policy regimes on multilateral trade 
through the exchange rate channel. The last column reports the result of instrument 
variable estimation. The percentage of countries having exchange-rate targeting policy 
in the region of country i is used as the instrument variable. This instrument variable, 
indeed, follows a similar rationale to the instrument variable used in the estimation 
with bilateral data. The main result on the trade performance of various monetary 
policy regimes in these alternative specifications and instrument variable estimation 
                                                 
14 However, it should be emphasized that the equation for the effect of monetary policy regimes on 
trade at multilateral level is rather ad hoc and receives less theoretical support than the gravity model. 
15 The group for comparison, however, is the inflation targeting regime in this study rather than the 
floating regime in Frankel and Rose (2002). 
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remains the same. This result, surprisingly, is consistent with the naïve comparison in 
the previous section. 
 
 
Table 7. Monetary Policy Regimes and Multilateral Trade  
 OLS Fixed Effect
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All exchange-rate targeting -0.08  
(0.07)  
-0.03  
(0.03)  
    
Non-currency union 
exchange-rate targeting 
  
-0.08** 
(0.03)  
-0.07** 
(0.03)  
-0.07**  
(0.03)  
-0.21***
(0.04)  
Currency union 
membership 
  
0.14** 
(0.06)  
0.13** 
(0.06)  
0.14**  
(0.06)  
0.14** 
(0.06)  
Log of real gross domestic 
products 
0.96***
(0.04)  
0.94***
(0.06)  
0.96***
(0.06)  
0.94***
(0.07)  
0.95*** 
(0.07)  
0.96***
(0.07)  
Log of land area -0.13***
(0.04)  
     
Island -0.16  
(0.14)  
     
Landlocked -0.15  
(0.10)  
     
Advanced economy 0.04  
(0.15)  
     
Nominal exchange rate 
volatility 
-0.06***
(0.01)  
-0.02***
(0.01)  
-0.03***
(0.01)  
  
-0.03***
(0.01)  
26 
Real exchange rate 
volatility 
   
-0.01  
(0.01)  
  
       
N 1,725 1,725 1,725 1,725 1,725 1,725
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71
Hausman (p-value)  0.00     
       
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Year effects are included but not reported 
Standard errors are clustered at country level 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The effects of a common currency and a direct peg relationship under fixed exchange 
rate on trade are well studied. The monetary policy of the floating rate regime, 
however, is usually ignored and thus the effect of other monetary policy regimes on 
trade remains unknown. In contrast to the absence of empirical study on this area, 
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2000) highlights the importance of well-defined 
alternative monetary policy regimes in trade using a full equilibrium model. 
 
This paper attempts to fill the gap in this area using a new de facto classification of 
monetary policy regimes in Wong and Chong (2014). Using the two well-defined 
monetary policy regimes, inflation targeting and exchange-rate targeting as identified 
in the classification, the effect of inflation targeting monetary policy on trade is 
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studied. The effects of a common currency and a direct peg relationship reported in 
this paper are highly consistent with previous studies. Furthermore, the main result 
provides evidence on the positive effect of inflation targeting policy on bilateral trade 
between two inflation targeting countries. 
 
Even though the effect of inflation targeting policy on trade between inflation 
targeting countries is much more moderate than a direct peg under exchange-rate 
targeting regime (6% vs 21%), the positive effect of inflation targeting regime could 
be shared by a much larger number of countries in the same regime. The effect of a 
direct peg on trade, however, is restricted to a single anchor country for exchange-rate 
targeting regime. This suggests that a stronger effect of a direct peg on trade does not 
necessarily result in a higher level of multilateral trade for exchange-rate targeting 
regime. Empirically, results of the fixed effect model suggest that inflation targeting 
regime has a higher level of multilateral trade than exchange-rate targeting regime 
excluding countries in currency union. 
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Appendix A: A Note on the de facto Classification of Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
In Wong and Chong (2014), we provide a de facto classification of monetary policy 
regimes for 228 countries reported to the IMF over the post-Bretton Woods period 
from 1974 to 2009. Upon excluding 3,902 observations with unavailable data for at 
least one of the classification variables16 and 161 outliers in the data, the remaining 
3,917 observations are classified using the K-mean cluster analysis. 
 
Monetary policy regimes under classification are the two typical monetary policy 
frameworks, the exchange-rate targeting and inflation targeting policy regime. 
Volatility of three economic variables, namely interest rate, exchange rate and 
inflation are used as the classification variables and Table A1 presents their relative 
volatility under the two targeting policies derived from a basic New Keynesian model 
following Galí (2008). 
 
Table A1. Relative volatility of economic variables under two regimes 
  Interest rate
Volatility
Exchange 
rate Volatility 
Inflation
Volatility
Magnitude 
of Shock 
Openness Targeting  
High Low Inflation High High Low 
High Low Exchange Rate High Low High 
High High Either High Low Low 
Low Either Either Low Low Low 
 
The classification procedure follows several steps. Following Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005), two percent of the upper tail of observations of each 
classification variables is removed from the data. These outliers are classified into 
alternative monetary policy regimes in the later step. The remaining observations are 
range standardized and classified into the four clusters described in Table A1. As 
described in Table A1, the classification results in two inconclusive categories: the 
first shows evidence of monetary policy intervention, but policy target is unclear; the 
                                                 
16 In some cases, data of a country may not be available since the country does not exist in the entire 
sample period. Out of the 228 countries reported in the list of IMF, 186 countries have been classified at 
least for one period. 
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second has low volatility in both instrument and target variables because of less 
intensity of underlying shock.  
 
Observations in these two inconclusive clusters are further analyzed with re-
standardized variables. For observations in the first inconclusive cluster, they are 
further classified into alternative monetary policy regimes in a second stage. In the 
second stage, only the two target variables are used for classification as the data to be 
classified have already shown clear evidence of policy intervention in the previous 
stage. For the second inconclusive cluster, another round of classification with the 
four described clusters using all three classification variables is performed to account 
for different levels of underlying macroeconomic volatility, as suggested in Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). Finally, three rounds of the two-stage classification 
have been performed with 1,275 observations left in the inconclusive group. 
 
In the final step, observations that remain unclassified are further analyzed. In addition 
to the 1,275 inconclusive observations in the cluster analysis, this also includes the 
161 outliers and 3,902 observations with unavailable classification variables that are 
excluded from the classification procedure. The classification of the 161 outliers is 
straightforward and most of them can be assigned to one of the cluster centers 
identified in the cluster analysis with minimum distance. The ad hoc classification of 
the 1,275 inconclusive observations and 3,902 observations with unavailable variables 
is based on the methodology of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). An observation 
is assigned to the exchange rate targeting regime if it (i) has zero volatility in the 
exchange rate, or (ii) is identified as a fixed exchange rate regime by the IMF and has 
less than 0.1% volatility in the exchange rate. Similar to Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005), the 0.1% volatility in the exchange rate places a comfortable 
buffer from the minimum exchange rate volatility of the inflation targeting regime 
(which is 0.2%). In this sense, countries without an independent legal tender including 
members of Euro zone are also classified as exchange rate targeting. Finally, the 
classification has identified 2,957 country-year observations in the exchange rate 
targeting regime and 1,489 observations in the inflation targeting regime. The 
classification procedure is depicted in Figure A1. 
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Figure A1. The Classification Procedure 
 
 
 
